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of advocacy for a British rearmament 
policy, and ideological opposition to 
Nazism serves as a powerful contrast to 
Chamberlain’s flawed use of Realpolitik.
Bew breaks less original ground in 
the post-1945 period, as Realpolitik in 
the postwar United States is decidedly 
intertwined with the much-discussed 
“realist” school of foreign policy 
exemplified by academics such as Hans 
Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. The 
term’s Germanic origins and use by 
discredited proponents of the Second 
and Third Reichs undoubtedly contrib-
uted to a period of limited use, even by 
self-proclaimed realists. Bew’s narrative, 
post-1945, begins to merge into the 
broader discussion of the different 
schools of American foreign policy that 
emerged during the Cold War—an area 
of much previous research without room 
for the compelling scholarship offered 
in this book’s early chapters. Like all 
who study “realism,” Bew is drawn to an 
extended meditation on Henry Kissinger 
and his influence on U.S. foreign policy. 
Refreshingly, Bew is cognizant of the 
subtlety and nuance of Kissinger’s world-
view and refuses to paint that enigmatic 
figure with an overly broad brush.
Realpolitik: A History is an important 
contribution to international relations 
scholarship, not least for resurrecting 
Ludwig von Rochau and the origins of 
Realpolitik. Bew is to be credited with 
tracing the term’s evolution in multiple 
countries with different political cultures 
with relative ease and skill, showing time 
and again the slow metamorphosis of the 
term into something far different from 
what its creator intended. Particularly 
in the interwar appeasement debate, 
Realpolitik found itself misused toward 
ends that were anything but realist. More 
broadly, the term has been twisted to 
mean any policy that is believed to lack a 
moral foundation or, from the contrary 
viewpoint, is seen as grounded in realis-
tic levelheadedness. As Bew’s narrative 
ends and the term is gradually subsumed 
into the broader tradition of American 
realism, the reader is reminded of the 
inherent flimsiness of the structure of 
so many of the terms endemic to the 
debate over American foreign policy. 
Professor Bew’s new book is a helpful 
antidote to such rhetorical laziness.
ALEXANDER B. GRAY
Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice, by Wil-
liam C. Martel. New York: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2015. 548 pages. $115.
“The main goal of this book,” Martel 
writes, “is to provide contemporary 
policy makers and scholars with a 
rigorous historic and analytic framework 
for evaluating and conducting grand 
strategy” (p. ix). Acknowledging that 
the term itself is “relatively new,” 
although its concepts certainly can 
be found throughout history, Martel 
credits academics during World 
War II (particularly “the founder of 
modern grand strategy, Edward Mead 
Earle”) with being the first to focus 
on a nation’s “highest political ends,” 
employing all elements of national 
power—“diplomatic, informational, 
military, economic”—to achieve global, 
long-term security goals (pp. 23, 25, 30). 
He thus elevates grand strategy above 
“strategy,” “operations,” “tactics,” and 
“technology” while acknowledging that 
for most of history “strategy”—how to 
achieve overall military victory—was 
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largely identical with “grand strategy” 
when the other components of national 
power were inconsequential. Thus, 
until the twentieth century, the Royal 
Navy—not English ambassadors nor 
the East India Company nor the 
inventors of steam power—dominated 
Britannia’s grand strategy because it 
determined Great Britain’s strategy, i.e., 
its means of winning important wars.
Martel’s theoretical presentation 
explains strategic thinkers from Sun 
Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, 
and Locke through Jomini, Clausewitz, 
Smith, Hamilton, and List. From the 
sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, 
Martel reviews Philip II, Frederick II, 
Napoleon, Bismarck, and Metternich, 
then examines the apogees and declines 
of the British and Ottoman Empires.
“Revolutionary” thinkers—Marx, Lenin, 
Trotsky, Mao, Hitler, and Ho—are also 
covered because of their impact on 
the contemporary world. However, 
“[w]ith the advent of thermonuclear 
weapons, classic approaches to strategy 
[for military victory] became largely 
irrelevant, having lost any practical 
meaning in the face of intolerable urban 
destruction, if not the annihilation 
of societies and humanity itself. This 
development effectively shifted strategy 
from its historical foundations of how to 
win wars to how to avoid wars” (p. 121).
Turning in the second half of this 
book to American history, Martel 
asserts that the nation’s grand strategy 
fundamentally has been that of neither a 
“status-quo” state nor a “revolutionary” 
one; it consistently has been that of a 
“gradualist” state, always seeking change 
but never rapid and radical change. 
“Restraining Sources of Disorder” is the 
chapter title for American foreign policy 
from Theodore Roosevelt through 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Since 1945, the 
United States has opposed revolutionar-
ies but supported democratic-leaning 
reform. (Critics certainly would argue 
specifics, pointing to instances of 
American to-the-hilt backing of 
undemocratic rule when specific 
economic, political, or military priorities 
submerged sensitivity to social justice.)
The heart of Martel’s descriptive review 
of American grand strategy and his 
prescriptive conclusion on the future 
of that strategy rest on three principles 
that Martel argues always must be 
balanced. The first is that the domestic 
foundations of American economic, 
military, diplomatic, and social power 
have to be strong. (It is illuminating 
to view two centuries of American 
foreign policy from the internal 
perspective of the influence of slavery, 
territorial expansion, isolationism, and 
economic development rather than the 
usual wars, crises, and treaties. On the 
other hand, when Martel’s “domestic 
foundations” of national strength 
extend to “education, health care, and 
retirement systems,” questions about 
prioritization naturally arise [p. 355].)
The second principle, of leading efforts 
to restrain “sources of disorder that 
present direct threats to U.S. vital 
interests,” is complicated by Martel’s 
assertion that “America needs to stand 
for and defend principles that promote 
human rights and dignity, equality for 
all peoples—men and women—freedom 
of expression, free enterprise, and fair 
elections” (pp. 357–58). Thus, realist 
attempts to distinguish American “vital 
interests” from Wilsonian idealism are 
rejected. But how then are extensive 
economic relations with China or 
Saudi Arabia to be weighed in light of 
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blatant human rights violations if all are 
“American vital interests”? Yes, it can be 
done—but the argument is less clear.
Martel’s final principle is that the 
nation must strengthen alliances 
and partnerships to promote shared 
responsibilities effectively to solve global 
problems. Recognizing that American 
power is limited, Martel counsels against 
temptations toward either American 
overreach or American withdrawal on 
key global and regional problems.
Martel applies these principles to 
“current” foreign policy issues to 
illustrate their utility; the inevitable 
drawback to such relevance is the danger 
of “shelf life” interest, i.e., how long 
will readers care about or even recall 
foreign policy specifics from 2014? 
Conversely, some topics that seem 
important at the time of this writing 
(e.g., violent Wahhabism, Russian 
aggressiveness) receive little attention.
A weakness of generalized, historically 
centered summaries of policy decisions 
is the tendency to see, in retrospect, 
clear choices and definite paths, but 
to underestimate the uncertainty and 
angst that decision makers suffered. By 
contrast, specific case studies (e.g., the 
Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam, the 2003 
Iraq war, the 2008 economic crisis) al-
ways show the confusion and fear. Mar-
tel’s sweeping review gives surprisingly 
little attention to the fact that nearly 
all grand strategy decisions are made 
while under risk or amid uncertainty by 
those who are fraught with anxiety and 
apprehension, and constitute gambles on 
guesses rather than calm choices about 
how best to balance good principles and 
achieve optimal outcomes. Martel—who 
certainly understood the policy-making 
process—might have replied that the 
purpose of his final book was to advise 
policy makers and scholars on how such 
decisions should be made, rather than to 
describe how they will feel while doing 
so. But readers might have benefited 
from at least an acknowledgment of 
this apprehension, the way Bill Martel 
used to offer a cheerful but sympathetic 
smile to friends and students struggling 
with problems he had posed to us.
The date of this book’s release—12 
January 2015—was the day its author 
died at the age of fifty-nine after a 
yearlong battle with leukemia. Bill 
Martel was for ten years a professor 
of international security studies at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 
at Tufts University (where he received 
the James L. Paddock award for teaching 
excellence) and an adjunct electives 
professor at the Naval War College. 
Previously, he had taught in the College’s 
National Security Decision Making 
Department for half a dozen years, 
following a similar period as founding 
director of the Air Force’s Center for 
Strategy and Technology at the Air War 
College. He also had served as an adviser 
to the National Security Council and the 
Romney 2012 presidential campaign. 
This reviewer was one of his many 
colleagues and students who counted 
themselves blessed by his friendship.
THOMAS GRASSEY
The Struggle for Sea Power: A Naval History of 
the American Revolution, by Sam Willis. New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2016. 608 pages. $35 (Kindle 
$16.05).
Sam Willis describes (p. 5) the war for 
American independence as “the most 
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